I’m Will Archer. I run a honeypot fleet and an isolated detonation lab out of Brisbane, reverse-engineer what they catch, and write up what I find.
A 2014 CosmicDuke-style stealer in a Chrome Updater costume: three transports, one build ID
A static look at a 2012-era loader wrapping a 2014 stealer whose config lists FTP, WebDAV and HTTP channels for both upload and tasking. Includes the wire formats, the build markers, and why a sandbox tagged it with nine unrelated malware families.
A registrar, a password, and node -e: a BeaverTail stage-4 with PBKDF2 and AES-256-CBC
Static RE of a 7,867-byte BeaverTail stage-4 loader. Two unauthenticated bare GETs: a /s// registrar whose response starts with the ASCII prefix ‘JS6’ and base64-decodes to a CSV naming the /main host, and a /main fetch returning salt:iv:ct hex that decrypts to JavaScript under a hardcoded password via PBKDF2-SHA256/100k. The next stage then runs under node -e. Password recovered. No execution, no live fetch.
A ShadowPad test build: the packet codec, and what the "MyTest" markers tell you
A static walk through one ShadowPad DLL: the stage-1 decryption, the 16 plugins in Root, the 20-byte packet header and its cipher, and why six copies of the string MyTest make me think this is a developer or tester build rather than an operational one.
An NPS fork with teeth: static RE of a SNOWLIGHT / VShell stage-2
A stripped, garble-obfuscated Go ELF delivered by the SNOWLIGHT / UNC5174 stager chain. Static RE recovers the config (AES-128-CBC from MD5(vkey)), the AES-256-GCM record layer and NPS-derived stream multiplexer, the full command set including LocalRun’s in-process shellcode execution and PluginRun’s memfd+LD_PRELOAD trick, and the kill-switch files. No detonation, no C2 contact.
nginx eats the NULs: recovering PolinRider stage 3 from a detonation pcap
PolinRider stage-3 (/$/boot) couldn’t be decoded by anyone, including by the operator’s own next-stage. It isn’t fingerprint-gated — the operator’s nginx/PHP layer strips every 0x00 byte from the body, so about 0.9% of a repeating-key XOR stream vanishes and the decode falls apart at the first plaintext char == key char (offset 144). Here’s the mechanism, the reconstruction (n-gram beam search over ‘byte-was-dropped-here’ + RC4 key-pool brute force on the string table), and what the recovered stage does: sandbox blocklist, environment exfiltration via /snv, injection into developer tooling (VS Code, Cursor, Antigravity, Discord, GitHub Desktop, global npm cli.js), a clipboard stealer targeting LLM-API keys alongside wallet material, and the operator’s own test-machine hostnames in the strings.
One ASN, nine live C2s in a week: what a reseller network's prefix space looks like from ThreatFox
A one-week ThreatFox sweep across all 68 IPv4 prefixes of AS399629, which families showed up and which didn’t, and a licence-file fingerprint that links one NetSupport RAT operator across two hosters. About the network and its tenants, not the people behind it.
Three TLS layers and two yamux sessions: reading a BRICKSTORM backdoor without running it
A static teardown of one BRICKSTORM Go sample: how it hides its C2 behind DNS-over-HTTPS, WebSocket and three nested TLS handshakes, what the four command bytes do, and the network signatures that fall out of it. No execution, no C2 contact.